

## **Trust as an experiential quality versus trust as a measurable quantity?<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

Several attempts have been made to construct measures of trust, in an attempt to gauge its role as a component of “social capital” and, furthermore, its importance for the functioning of an economy. Its role in modern decentralised management, particularly with respect to the spread of networked companies, has also been discussed often. This paper attempts to link such quantitative measurements to the experiential quality of trust – what “we” experience if or when “we” trust. The experiential quality is approached by comparing arguments found in the (particularly philosophical) literature with personal experience. The conclusion from mapping personal experiences on existing suggestions to measure trust is that more attention to the experiential qualities of trust of the researcher him/herself as well as of those s/he researches will allow more precise “measures” of trust – measures which could also be useful for direct application by participants in situations where the presence of trust is deemed both necessary and uncertain.

### **From private thoughts to a public outline**

When I first read about the *cost 24* workshop, where the draft version of this paper was presented, I was excited: Finally, there was a prospect to meet other scientist who shared the concern about the topic of trust – to meet them in person, not just in published pages.

My own conscious engagement with trust had started as an outgrowth of trying to understand the complexities of foreign donor’s efforts to support participatory agricultural research in Zambia. I am grateful that Ulrich Schiefer allowed me to look beyond the theoretical framework of “power and participation” by introducing “trust” into our discussions about the Zambian case. In the years following that discussion I came to see trust as essential for all human interactions – in its presence as in its absence. This view was shared by some of the authors I read, but rarely in the scientific discussions in which I participated in recent years – hence the excitement when being alerted to this workshop by a colleague, an excitement which collapsed when I saw the deadline for submission of abstracts: it was already over. Due to a fortuitous meeting with Prof. Förster at the VAD conference on *Knowledge and Science in Africa*, I still got a chance to share some of my views with you, and my spirits rose. They sank again as I reflected on the meaning of the invitation to this workshop, which suggested that the identification of *types of trust* is necessary for giving adequate accounts of transformations in times of crisis – they sank because I fear that typologies of trust bring with them the danger of further fragmenting an already fragmented world, taking apart in an analytic fashion one of the few human experiences which seem to offer a bridge across existing divides: the experience to act without fear, while being open towards the “inside” as much as towards the “outside”. As far as I can see, this constitutes the (cross-cultural) unity of the *quality* of the experience of trust. I am grateful that this does not contradict some of the most recent summaries from sociological and psychological perspectives: Möllering (2006)

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<sup>1</sup> A draft version of this paper was presented at the workshop *Towards a Typology of Trust*, Cost Action 24, Working Group 3, University of Basel, Institut fuer Ethnologie, Dec. 8-9, 2006. This version incorporates part of the interdisciplinary discussions at the workshop.

finds that all trust ultimately involves a “leap of faith”, and Barbalet (2005) argues that the *emotion* of trust<sup>2</sup> as a calm acceptance of dependance on someone else in the end is not irrational, but, on the contrary, contributes to “substantial rationality” (as opposed to “formal rationality”). Neither of these authors, however, mentions self-reflection as a source for such propositions.

Unexpectedly, I had a chance to raise the reservation about typology right at the beginning of the workshop, and to see it travel through the workshop, which allows me to pick up some of the threads in this paper. The reservation stems from my own experiences with trust in different cultural contexts: finding that it is possible to develop mutually trusting relationships even across language barriers has led me to the conclusion that trust is a phenomenon which is experienced in similar ways in all cultures. *After* having developed what I trust to be a reasonably trusting relationship to a Namibian co-researcher<sup>3</sup>, it was possible to discover that our experiences with two different Namibian informants were similar: with one, we both felt more “at ease” than with the other. And we found that this allowed us to discuss more freely what we really thought about the situation in the village and in the farmers’ association in which both of them were engaged: we agreed that we both *trusted* one of the two more than the other – and this was what allowed us to be more open.

Reviewing some of the abundant literature I found that experiential qualities are rarely taken into account, particularly in the political, economic, and sociological literature. I was somewhat amazed to find the most realistic descriptions of the phenomenon of trust in texts written by two philosophers: Annette Baier (2001) and Trudy Govier (1997). Their accounts resonated most with my own experience and thinking about that experience: to see trust fundamentally as a quality of experience which “feels” similar across cultures, and has similar effects, as the first conference in the *COST* framework<sup>4</sup> had demonstrated and as is reflected in the literature on the positive effects of trust at the individual, interpersonal, organizational, and even societal level.

So this paper is a plea to look at one’s own *experience* of and with trust and to reflect on this experience in a trusting conversation with others – in a fashion I like to call *collaborative self-reflection*. The first element in *collaborative self-reflection* is self-observation: If we accept that *experience* is a phenomenon which happens *inside* the mind-body system which constitutes a human being, this experiential quality can only be accessed through self-observation. And we need the *collaboration* of another human being to find out to what extent this self-observed quality of the experience of trust is an idiosyncrasy or is shared by others – maybe by most others: we need to compare our own reflected-upon experience with the reflected-upon experience of someone else. This, however, only makes sense if the partners in such a collaborative self-reflection are sincere in their observations and honest towards each other – and unless they *know* that they all feel strongly committed to an ethics of sincerity and honesty, this requires trust. Thus, the investigation of the *experience* of trust needs trust.

Even if more distanced modes of research – i.e. “positivist” modes of data collection through questionnaires or strictly controlled direct observation - are engaged to explore the question of how it feels to trust and what it means to trust, the results of such research only make sense if statements by respondents and/or observations of participants are trusted to be truthful

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<sup>2</sup> “Trust is the feeling of confidence in another’s future actions and also confidence concerning one’s own judgement of another. Thus there is necessarily a double confidence within trust.”

<sup>3</sup> In the framework of the interdisciplinary research project *Language, Gender and Sustainability*. At this point I wish to gratefully acknowledge funding by the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* for this project.

<sup>4</sup> *Threatened Trust: The Transformation of the State and Fading Civil Security*; Basel, January 9 and 10, 2006

expressions of their experiences: one can perform a perfect statistical analysis of a set of questionnaires all filled in an intentionally misleading way. I do not believe this really happens: I just want to point out that it is conceivable, and that therefore even the most objective methods of social science research at some level depend on trust – on the trust that this hypothetical case will *not* happen. As Hans Peter Duerr put it (Duerr 1974: 14 – translation R.D.)<sup>5</sup>: “A statement is reasonable if we accept its reasonability. And at some point this means that we *accept* its reasonability, and not so much that we accept its *reasonability*.”

In that sense I follow Duerr in asking about *our* conditions for accepting the reasonability of statements about trust and the consequences of trusting, contrasting this with a presentation of the *reasonability* of published materials on measuring trust. When preparing the abstract for this paper I was clear about this intention, and I knew from previous internet research that “trust” measurements play an increasingly important role in market research, organizational consulting and research, as well as in research trying to understand processes of economic development and the transformation processes in former socialist countries. At that time, however, I had no personal knowledge of concrete ways of *measuring* trust, but trusted that I would find something relevant in this respect in the time remaining before this seminar – scanning search results in Google and Amazon as the fastest way to access published information.

The reliance on modern technical systems proved justified: it provided enough *credible* material to present a brief on ways of measuring trust in the following section, before moving on to the convergence of personal experience and the descriptions by philosophers already mentioned. In the last section I will come back to the plea for an explicit focus on self-reflection about personal experiences as a research tool: reviewing some of the results of empirical research my trust in the reasoning capacities of “common people” was strengthened sufficiently to advertise *collaborative self-reflection* as a way to understand trust by trying to build trust. This, I believe, allows to meet the conclusion Anthony Giddens draws from the fundamental *double hermeneutics* of social science: social scientists need to think about the societal consequences of producing theoretical concepts about society<sup>6</sup>.

## Measurements of trust

I trust that whoever has engaged with the internet as a research tool knows that this exercise is sometimes exciting for its chance discoveries, and at other times overwhelming because of the sheer volume of available references. Gone are the days of early science, when conducting research depended on a network of a few individuals connected only by letters and trust (Mauelshagen 2003). Instead of being eager for every word of a trusted colleague – as I imagine scientists of those days of what we now call the age of Enlightenment were – I believe that many of today’s scientists share my own reluctance to take on the duty to read yet another essay or book on the topic for the sake of comprehensiveness.

In the case of preparing for this paper, the number of references for the German word *Vertrauen* on *Google* had risen from 867.000 in November 2002 (Frevert 2003: 7) to 21.500.000 on December 3, 2006. As far as published accounts are concerned, *amazon.de*

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<sup>5</sup> “Begründet ist ein Urteil, wenn wir es gelten lassen, und das heißt irgendwann gelten *lassen* und nicht so sehr *gelten* lassen.“

<sup>6</sup> “The implications of the double hermeneutic is that social scientists can’t but be alert to the transformative effects that their concepts and theories might have upon what it is they set out to analyse.” (Giddens, 1996: 77)

gives 883 hits, while *amazon.com* lists 4971 published sources. It becomes worse if you use the English word *trust*: 291 Million hits on *Google*, 4.086 at *amazon.de*, and 317.215 at *amazon.com*.

Despite this information overload, the method enabled access to abstracts or even the full text of recent diploma theses, dissertations and research projects focusing on trust (Kohring 2004, Klietsch 2004, Kassebaum 2004, Friedrich 2004). I believe these texts to be trustworthy sources for an overview over the vast literature, especially if their representation conforms to overviews in other publishes sources (e.g. *Introduction* to Hartmann 2001, Möllering 2006, Nooteboom 2003).

These overviews, however, lack a historical perspective reaching back further than the *Interpersonal Trust Scale* ITS developed by the American psychologist Julian Rotter (Rotter 1967). The historian's look at dictionary entries (Frevert 2003) reveals both continuity and change concerning the *focus* of published titles on trust as revealed in the distribution of search results at *amazon.de* and *amazon.com*: The historian informs us that the first entry of the word *trust* in a dictionary in 1746 had little attention for aspects of trust other than those dealing with God. Later dictionaries shifted the emphasis first to trust in the family, then to trust in friends, and finally to trust in oneself (Frevert 2003: 14ff.). In the modern publication spectrum, 35 of 883 German titles (i.e 4%), and 26730 out of 317047 titles in the English language (i.e. 8,4%) are concerned with God – the second most important category after “Self-confidence” (as the author translated the German word *Selbstvertrauen* into English). Second, but far behind: 253 titles (i.e. 28,7% of 883 for *Vertrauen*) were thrown up by searching with *Selbstvertrauen*, and 74806 (i.e. 23,5% of 317047) by a search using “Self-confidence.” It one takes the number of published titles as an indication, “trust in oneself” occupies about one fourth of the trust terrain in modern thought, while “trust in God” is only between half (for English titles) and one fifth (for German titles) of that share. This, however, is still far above the share of books dealing with both trust and other items such as “organization”, “management”, “psychology”, “leadership”, “control”, “corporation”, “therapy”, “medicine”, “health”, “children”: all of these combinations with trust hover below or around 1%. Only “love” (3,5% in German and 6,5% in English) and “education” (2,6% in German) get anywhere near (see Appendix 1 for details).

### *Measuring Trust in Psychology*

Pre-occupation with the individual's capacity to trust also was the focus of Rotter's *Interpersonal Trust Scale* which attempted to categorize people into either “high trusters” or “low trusters.” Today, more than thirty years later, Rotter's ITS still provides the basis for the measurement of the trust levels of individuals, as evidenced in Kassebaum's doctoral dissertation in which reports in detail the development of a reliable instrument to measure trust in the individual (Kassebaum<sup>7</sup> 2004), or Friedrich's dissertation which asks for the contribution of other disciplines of social sciences to the theory of economic decision making, also testing the possibilities of using the internet as a mechanism for obtaining responses to questionnaires (Friedrich 2004).

In line with my focus on the experiential aspect of trust, I would now like to give you a taste of the questions used to gauge the general disposition to trust of a German speaking individual.

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<sup>7</sup> Quoting another psychologist, Kassebaum mentions that the 25 items of the original Rotter scale intended to measure the “general trust” persons would display in unfamiliar situations. The original items can be grouped in 1) statements concerning society and the future, 2) statements about political and social institutions, 3) statements about the trustworthiness of the media, and 4) statements about the trustworthiness of different groups.

How would you respond to the following statements – which are a sample of the 65 items for the standard trust scale developed by Kassebaum, culled from several hundred through several stages of careful screening? You are asked to signal (in this case: to yourself) whether the statements characterize your own experience (“fully” or “somewhat”) or run against what you believe to be true (“strongly” or “somewhat”). You can also indicate that you are neutral with respect to any one of the following sample statements:

1. Usually I am very cautious when I encounter strangers
2. I am sometimes afraid that so-called “experts” could make decisions which would negatively affect my well-being
3. I sometimes fear, my friends might on purpose do something which is directed against me or which could harm me.
4. If I entrust something personal to my friends, I can be sure that they will not talk to others about it.
5. Whenever others perform a task for me, I would rather make sure all the time that they do it according to my wishes and intentions.
6. If you do not regularly control people at their workplace, they will become negligent or take advantage of their position.
7. I have neighbours whom I could entrust my apartment keys with a feeling of calmness; they would not enter my apartment to look into my personal things or to steal, even if I was away for a long time.
8. Even in private relationships I have to be afraid that the others will use their knowledge against me.
9. I can disclose my thoughts and feelings to my friends.
10. I often fear that strangers could seriously harm me and my environment.
11. If I fell ill and could not leave my apartment any more, my neighbours would surely notice and start worrying about me.
12. I disclose my thoughts and feelings to my partner.
13. I find it difficult to trust my partner
14. When I am together with my partner, I experience moments when I can completely let go.
15. It is very difficult for me to trust institutions such as the administration, government offices, etc.
16. Most people would use the opportunity to benefit at the expense of others.
17. Ultimately, you can trust other people.

Whatever your opinion after this “tasting” – be aware that such instruments are routinely used by psychologists, as the recent development of a calibrated and validated *German* version (Kassebaum 2004) demonstrates. Similar questions are also used in abbreviated form in standard social surveys and in marketing research. Having seen other attempts to *validate* questionnaires *reliable* instruments to measure the level – or *quantity* – of trust a person can muster (Romano 2003, Butler 1991), I find it difficult *not* to trust the impression that such instruments replace trust in the human ability to assess other human beings by trust in the instrument – for those who believe in them: the recent assurance that qualitative and quantitative instruments complement each other may mask an unresolved debate between adherents of qualitative and adherents of quantitative social science concerning what constitutes a “fact” and what constitutes a valid interpretation.

*Measuring Trust in Sociology*

Distinguishing between “low trusters” and “high trusters” acquired some fame with Fukuyama’s suggestion to apply the concept to societies, arguing that “low trust societies” would find it more difficult than “high trust societies” to create prosperity through economic growth under modern conditions. Basing his interpretations on data from general social surveys, Fukuyama argued that the creation of wealth depends on trusting relationships with individuals beyond the circle of the family, which only occurs in “high trust societies” such as Japan or Germany, but is lacking in “low trust societies” such as Southern Italy or China. It has been pointed out that Fukuyama’s reference to trust in fact lacks a precise measurement (Wolf 1995), which he admits in his contribution to the IMF conference on *Second Generation Reforms* in 1999:

A general question such as "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" (asked on both the General Social Survey and World Values Survey) won't give you very much precise information about the radius of trust among the respondents, or their relative propensities to cooperate with family, co-ethnics, co-religionists, complete strangers, and the like.

All he can therefore tell his distinguished audience at the IMF conference is that more precise measurements are necessary in order to properly understand trust and its role in the creation of wealth (Fukuyama 1999).

Such cautious remarks notwithstanding, the same very general question

*‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’*

is used in standardised official surveys (World Values Survey<sup>8</sup>, Eurobarometer<sup>9</sup>, and General Social Surveys<sup>10</sup> such as the German ALLBUS<sup>11</sup>), to gauge the level of trust of whole populations towards institutions, as well as amongst each other. On the basis of such measurements countries and institutions are compared (Delhay 2002). It seems that such measurements are increasingly taken into consideration in making decisions at the level of governments, administrations (with respect to the decision to publish data on the performance of hospitals in order to achieve public accountability see Katsorchi-Hayes & Pidd; undated). Indeed, the appropriateness of this measurement can be defended on statistical grounds against the critics who argue that trust may be understood in different ways in different cultures (Volken 2002)<sup>12</sup>

### *Measuring Trust in Economic Theory and Practice*

Gaining the trust of potential investors, including the general public, has been important for the development of the modern economic system – of capitalism (Bakan 2005, Legnaro et al. 2005) – and the trust of investors and the general public is still invoked today in public speeches of presidents, with reference to the government and to the economy in general.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

<sup>9</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm)

<sup>10</sup> <http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-SERIES/00028.xml>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.gesis.org/Dauerbeobachtung/Allbus/>

<sup>12</sup> „Im Aggregat bringt der Indikator, trotz unterschiedlicher Konnotation – partikulares versus universales Vertrauen –, prinzipiell dasselbe zum Ausdruck, nämlich den Grad der Generalisierung von Vertrauensbeziehungen und damit das Potential kooperativer Tauschbeziehungen innerhalb eines sozialen Kontextes.“

While a report of the German Institute for Economic research (DIW) in 2004 referred to a speech by former president Johannes Rau to underline the importance of the study's substantiation of the claims about the existence of a "crisis of trust" (Schupp and Wagner 2004), recent speeches of the incumbent German president Horst Köhler have moved to a more positive evaluation (Köhler 2005, 2006). Following Sztompka's studies (Sztompka 1995, 2003), the formation of social capital through trust has become important in assessing the prospects of economic development particularly in Eastern Europe (e.g. Maier 2004), sometimes in direct comparison to conditions in Western Europe (Holmes et al., undated).

Increasingly, measurements of trust based on questionnaire results also are taken into account in company decisions, where trust in a particular company (Bahlmann et al., undated), trust in a brand, or trust in a branch of business are measured. The necessity of precise measurement the trust levels of customers – in addition to the now standard tool of measuring customer satisfaction - is also seen as necessary because some companies have experienced that customers switched to other suppliers or service-providers despite high levels of reported customer satisfaction. Here, trust is seen as a means to develop customer loyalty to a firm (*Kundenbindung*, see Dornach & Schubert, 2004).

While some scientists are busy refining measurement instruments, others are asking what these instruments are actually measuring, based on different definitions. A review of studies of trust between customers and suppliers (Milancovic & Lentz, 2004) lists no less than 25 definitions of trust<sup>13</sup>, categorized in "cognitive" "conative" (stressing the disposition to act under conditions of vulnerability) and "alternative" definitions, the latter category containing definitions which do not restrict themselves to either the cognitive or the behavioural aspects. This study also gives an annex which summarizes 19 empirical and 14 conceptual studies of relevance to trust in customer-supplier relationships.

<sup>13</sup> Milancovic & Lentz (2004: 44) provide the following table:

Autor(en)	Wohlvollen	Kompetenz	Problem-lösungs-orientierung	Integrität
Andaleeb (1992)	X	X		
Anderson und Weitz (1989)		X		
Blois (1999)	X			
Butler (1991)	X	X		
Crosby, Evans und Cowles (1990)	X	X		
Doney und Cannon (1997)	X	X		
Ganesan (1994)	X	X		
Ganesan und Hess (1997)	X	X		
Hawes, Mast und Swan (1989)	X	X		
Hosmer (1995)	X			
Mayer, Davis und Schoorman (1995)	X	X		X
McAllister (1995)	X	X		
Moorman, Deshpandé und Zaltman (1993)		X		
Nooteboom, Berger und Noorderhaven (1997)	X			
Singh und Sirdeshmukh (2000)	X	X		
Sirdeshmukh, Singh und Sabol (2002)	X	X	X	
Smith und Barclay (1997)	X	X		
Swan und Nolan (1985)	X	X		
Swan, Bowers und Richardson (1999)	X	X		
Swan, Trawick, Rink et al. (1988)	X	X		
Zaltman und Moorman (1988)		X	X	
Zucker (1986)	X	X		

Tab. 03 Übersicht der kognitiven interpersonalen Vertrauensdimensionen

Another recent study (Smith and Holmes 1997) finds no difficulty in admitting that the literature presents a bewildering array of different definitions – and then simply adopts one definition and a modified “classical” instrument to study trust in small business networks:

There appears to be a lack of consensus on the definition of trust, and as a result there is considerable uncertainty about the components of trust and how it develops. The abstract nature of trust is summarised by Barber (1983 p.7) who states that, “both in serious social thought and everyday discourse it is assumed that the meaning of trust ... is so well known that it can be left undefined or to contextual implications”

...

Hosmer (1995) provides a definition that recognises the importance of trust in on-going economic exchange relationships, such as networks: “trust is the reliance by one person, group or firm upon a voluntarily accepted duty on the part of another person, group or firm to recognize and protect the rights and interests of all others engaging in a joint endeavour or economic exchange”

...

Due to the large number of variables requiring measurement for the research project, a shorter form of Butler’s CTI instrument was constructed. One statement was taken from the dimensions contained in Butler’s CTI, based on the highest item-to-factor correlation, which is consistent with the method adopted to shorten several established research instruments (see for example, Cummings and Bromiley 1996).

### *Trust measurement and sociological theory*

From a sociological point of view both Luhmann (Luhmann 1973) and Giddens (Giddens 1996) have argued that the main distinction is between “personal trust” and “system trust.” This distinction is often cited in the literature for its evolutionary perspective: in the course of historical development from “simple” to “complex” societies the trust based on (more or less) intimate knowledge of others – personal trust – is replaced by trust in the “systems” of society. This “disembedding” is particularly relevant for the switch from “guardians of traditions” to modern “experts” (Giddens 1996). It allows individuals to treat strangers “as if” they were familiars, to some extent at least: without trust in the expertise of doctors or bankers – to take two prominent examples – neither the health system nor the banking system could function – which to some extent corresponds with Fukuyama’s concern about the creation of wealth

The advantage of system trust is that less precautions against the failure of agreements or against possible future mistreatment need to be taken. Luhmann calls this a “reduction of complexity”, economists speak of a “reduction of transaction costs”. It therefore makes sense to say – as Möllering (2006) recently did in a presentation to a Max Planck Institute for Social Sciences - that at the *core* of the phenomenon of trust is the suspension of uncertainty – as recognized by virtually all existing definitions. Reviewing experiences of intercultural cooperation with Chinese business partners, he adds a cautioning question mark to what some of the advocates of trust strategies (such as Sprenger, 2002, or Brodbeck, 2004) advise: *Just do it?* The question mark is added because Möllering’s sample of cooperative ventures between Chinese and overseas companies contains both cases where a high trust strategy – accepting high risks based on the expectation of trust – led to the development of trust, as well as cases where it led to failure of the cooperation, because the initial trust was abused.

Without addressing the point directly, Möllering's account illustrates the point Luhmann emphasized in his early treatment of trust – that trust is inseparable from the possibility of deciding *differently*: from human freedom (Luhmann 1989(1973): 32 ):

the three structural components of a trust relationship (substitution of a more complex external order and its problems by an inner order and its problems, the need to learn, and symbolic control) all confirm our assumption that trust is about reduction of complexity, specifically that complexity which comes into the world through the freedom of the other human being. Trust has a function for registering and reducing that [particular] complexity<sup>14</sup>.

None of those authors quoting Luhmann's treatment of trust as a mechanism for the reduction of complexity which I have encountered so far, have mentioned Luhmann's insistence of the link between trust and human freedom, which, according to him, also plays a role in the development from "simple" societies, characterised by personal trust based on mutual familiarity of its members, to modern complex societies characterised by contingency and system trust (Luhmann 1989 (1973): 19):

Only to the extent that the other human being enters consciousness not as a thing of the world, but *as an alter ego possessed by the freedom to see things differently and to act differently* [emphasis added, R.D] is the traditional self-evidence of the world shattered, is a new dimension of the world's complexity rendered visible – a dimension for which at first no forms for capturing and absorbing it are available<sup>15</sup>.

And (Luhmann 1989 (1973): 43):

Freedom in the quasi pre-social form of the uncontrollable potential for action of other humans is the source of the need for trust; institutionalized freedom, i.e. freedom enshrined in the social order and thereby tamed is a complex of actions or aspects of action for which one is responsible, and is thus the source for the learnability of trust. For trust to develop and fulfill its function, freedom has to be transformed from the first of these forms into the second<sup>16</sup>.

When this happens, when freedom is transformed from being an uncontrollable potential for human action to the tamed form of responsibility for action, personal trust is largely transformed into system trust, which Luhmann considers as more stable (Luhmann 1989 (1973): 63f.):

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<sup>14</sup> „...alle drei Strukturkomponenten der Vertrauensbeziehung (Substitution einer Innenordnung und ihrer Problematik für eine komplexere Außenordnung und deren Problematik, Lernbedürftigkeit und symbolische Kontrolle) bestätigen unsere Vermutung, dass es beim Vertrauen um Reduktion von Komplexität geht, und zwar speziell um jene Komplexität, die durch die Freiheit des anderen Menschen in die Welt kommt. Vertrauen hat eine Funktion für die Erfassung und Reduktion dieser Komplexität.“

<sup>15</sup> „Erst in dem Maße, als der andere Mensch nicht nur als Gegenstand der Welt, sondern als alter ego ins Bewusstsein tritt, als Freiheit, die Dinge anders zu sehen und sich anders zu verhalten, wird die traditionelle Selbstverständlichkeit der Welt erschüttert, wird ihre Komplexität in einer ganz neuen Dimension sichtbar, für die vorerst keine angemessenen Formen der Erfassung und Absorption zu Verfügung stehen.“

<sup>16</sup> „Freiheit im gleichsam vorsozialen Sinne einer unkontrollierbaren Handlungspotenz anderer Menschen ist Quelle des Bedarfs für Vertrauen; institutionalisierte Freiheit, nämlich Freiheit, die in die Sozialordnung eingefangen und dort gezähmt ist als Komplex von Handlungen oder Handlungsaspekten, für die man persönlich die Verantwortung trägt, ist Quelle der Lernbarkeit des Vertrauens. Damit Vertrauen entstehen kann und seine Funktion erfüllen kann, muss Freiheit aus der einen Form in die anderen überführt werden.“

The conversion to system trust ... renders trust diffuse and thereby resistant, even immune against individual cases of disappointment which can always be explained or dealt with as particular cases, while personal trust may be exploded by telltale trifles. System trust does not have to be relearned over and over<sup>17</sup>.

Luhman sees the transformation to system trust necessitated by the development of increasingly complex social systems – supporting this complexity at the same time – clearly as an advance in civilization (Luhmann 1989 (1973): 66):

System trust encompasses a subtle semi-conscious awareness of the fact that all achievements are *fabricated* and all actions have been *decided* upon by comparison to alternative options. System trust counts on *explicit* processes of reducing complexity, i.e. it reckons with humans, not with nature. [emphasis Niklas Luhmann] The great civilizational processes of conversion to system trust offered mankind stability in its approach to contingency in a complex world, gave mankind the potential to live with the awareness that everything might be different. In these processes the social contingency of the world enters consciousness – which confronts thinking with the question of transcendental trust into the world's constitution through meaning<sup>18</sup>.

Maybe it was an embarrassment with having been too close to such fundamental issues such as human freedom on the one hand, and to an unreserved praise of civilization which moved Luhman to abandon the topic of trust in his later works, as Janne Javala mentions in her admirably complete treatment of influences on Luhmann and Luhmann's influences on others (Javala 2006). It could have been an embarrassment because the logic of autopoietic systems – which was the focus of Luhmann's later work – had no need for either personal matters or processes of civilization. From a *strict* systems point of view only the co-evolution of self-creating systems towards increasing internal complexity remains – and the task of the scientists is to describe how this works. Reading even the early Luhmann, I occasionally saw a tendency to couch what was probably very close to personal experience into the most abstract terms. It may be that the admiration for this ability contributed to Luhmann's position in the intellectual world – as an authority figure seen at the root of modern sociological investigations of trust. Considering the subtlety and complexity of Luhmann's early observations it is rather sad to note – as Javala does in her doctoral dissertation after a rather comprehensive review of the literature (Javala 2006: 206) - that “Many researchers have cited only two or three sentences from Luhmann's *Vertrauen*.”

One of the ideas offered by Luhman and taken up in particular by Giddens is the distinction between trust and confidence. According to Javala (2001), Luhmann and Giddens disagree on the relationship between trust and confidence: “According to Giddens, trust is continual as opposed to bound up with exact situations, as Luhmann argues.” This particular divergence of opinion is mentioned here because, as I see it, it concerns the quality of experience – and this

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<sup>17</sup> „Die Umstellung auf Systemvertrauen ... macht das Vertrauen diffus und dadurch widerstandsfähig, ja fast immun gegen einzelne Enttäuschungen, die stets speziell erklärt oder abregiert werden können, während das persönliche Vertrauen durch verräterische Kleinigkeiten zum Platzen gebracht werden kann. Das Systemvertrauen braucht nicht immer wieder neu gelernt zu werden.“

<sup>18</sup> „Im Systemvertrauen schwingt die Bewusstheit mit, dass alle Leistungen *hergestellt*, alle Handlungen im Vergleich mit anderen Möglichkeiten *entschieden* worden sind. Das Systemvertrauen rechnet mit *ausdrücklichen* Prozessen der Reduktion von Komplexität, also mit Menschen, nicht mit Natur. Die großen zivilisatorischen Prozesse der Umstellung auf Systemvertrauen geben der Menschheit eine stabile Einstellung zur Kontingenz in einer komplexen Welt, geben ihr die Möglichkeit, mit der Einsicht zu leben, dass alles anders sein könnte. In ihnen wird die soziale Kontingenz der Welt bewusstseinsfähig. Dem Denken stellt sich damit die Frage nach dem transzendentalen Vertrauen in die sinnhafte Konstitution der Welt.“

paper argues that the unity of the phenomenon of trust lies in its experiential *quality* rather than in its *function* – as Luhman claims at the end of his early book<sup>19</sup>. Giddens appears to be undecided between a focus on the personal qualities of trust and its functions for modern (and post-modern) society as opposed to traditional society. It would take more space than this paper allows for to show with sufficient detail that the divergence between Luhmann and Giddens might be resolved precisely by re-interpreting their differences in the light of personal experience – which they both avoid to discuss. It might then turn out that the very system trust both of them paint in bright colours is in fact not trust but a more or less fatalistic acceptance of conditions of life which people feel powerless to change under conditions of modernity. These have been analyzed in less optimistic terms by other observers, such as Zygmunt Baumann (1992), who devotes one full chapter to showing how Georg Simmel – the one classical sociologist cited by Luhmann and Giddens for his description of trust as hovering between knowing and not-knowing – described the increasing fragmentation in then modernising Germany by means of a sociology which has been criticized as being too fragmented<sup>20</sup>. Based on such alternative accounts of modernity as well as on alternative accounts of the experience of trust, such as that given by Delbert Barley (1980), one of the early critics of Niklas Luhman (Barley 1980: 16f.), it might be argued that what characterizes the experience of a great number of people is an overall decrease in the *depth* of the experience of trust, rather than a transformation of the characteristics of the experience of trust.

### *Classifications of trust and typologies of trust*

The factors which *allow* individuals to suspend their caution – what psychologists call the “sources of trust” (eg, Friedrich 2004<sup>21</sup>) – were explored in in-depth interviews in the development of a reliable trust scale by Kassebaum (2004), but are not assessed in standard

<sup>19</sup> Nur von seiner Funktion her kann [Vertrauen] als Einheit begriffen und mit anderen funktional äquivalenten Leistungen verglichen werden: *The unity of trust can only be comprehended by seeing it via its functions and by comparing it with other functionally equivalent system services.*

<sup>20</sup> So entsteht die typische problematische Lage des modernen Menschen: das Gefühl, von einer Unzahl von Kulturelementen umgeben zu sein, die für ihn nicht bedeutungslos sind, aber im tiefsten Grunde auch nicht bedeutungsvoll.: *Thus develops the typical and problematic condition of modern man: the sensation of being surrounded by an immense number of cultural elements which are not meaningless to him, but not really meaningful either at the deepest level.* (Baumann 1992: 231)

<sup>21</sup> ((Colette Friedrich 2004 S.146))

Vertrauensquelle Vertrauensobjekt	Erfahrungen im Tausch (Informationen)	Eigenschaften (Informationen)	Institutionen (Normen, Kultur, gemeinsame Lebenswelt)
Person Disembedding ↑	positive Erfahrungen mit Personen in Austauschbeziehungen	vertrauensrelevante Eigenschaften von Personen	Regelungen interpersoneller Austauschbeziehungen
System ↓ Reembedding	positive Erfahrungen mit sozialen Systemen in Austauschbeziehungen	vertrauensrelevante Eigenschaften sozialer Systeme	Regelungen interorganisationaler Austauschbeziehungen

**Abbildung 15: Exemplarische Zusammenführung von Vertrauensquelle und Vertrauensobjekt**  
Quelle: in Anlehnung an Loose/Sydow (1994), S. 180.

questionnaires. I mention this because it seems that this is in fact one of the factors which would allow typologies of trust which take into account that there is a common core to all *experiences* of trust : with suspension of risk as the common core, “types of trust” may be derived according to the *referents* of trust (*who* or *what* is trusted) and the *source* of trust (what nourishes trust).

These are not (yet) the main points of reference for classifications in the literature, however. The literature does provide classifications according to whether trust is “cognitive” (or “rational”) or “affective/emotional” (“irrational”), or “moral”, and then takes care of the behavioural consequences of trust.

The latter are at the core of a different instrument to investigate levels of trust in individuals, based on a rational-choice definition of trust going back to Coleman, and more recently expanded on by Hardin in his formulation of “encapsulated interest” (Hardin, 2002: individuals assess the balance of risk for themselves and others involved in an interaction and “decide” to trust if it is in the others’ self-interest to co-operate<sup>22</sup>). The classic formulation is the prisoner’s dilemma, which asks people to put themselves in the position of a robber who, together with his partner, is caught by the police. Lacking definite proof, the police need the cooperation of either of the two for a conviction, and therefore offer them both to cancel their sentence if they confess, thereby also accusing the other. The other will then get a high sentence for being guilty *and* not being cooperative. If both keep silent, the police cannot prove the case, but will convict them both on a different – minor – charge. If both confess, both will be convicted, but with a lower sentence because of being cooperative. The prisoners cannot communicate and therefore do not know about the others’ choice. What will they do?

The prisoner’s dilemma in various versions has been used in a number of psychological experimental set-ups as well as empirical surveys<sup>23</sup> – one of the more recent ones trying to differentiate between trust and the attitude towards risk in Paraguay (Schechter 2005). When a live demonstration of the PD (as it is commonly called in the specialist literature) was used to introduce confliction mediation as an important topic for participatory development at an IDS seminar (on “Participatory Technology Development” in 1994), it provided an opportunity for a good laugh: Everyone expected both partners to cooperate and to keep silent. But in fact one of them “defected”, i.e. confessed, thus benefiting at the expense of his partner. Asked why he did so, he said: “I thought my partner would remain silent – he seems the type.”

As I witnessed this incident, he simply exercised and trusted his own judgement, which allowed him to act “on the spot”, enjoying the deliberate surprise to his partner and to the audience, both of whom he had judged to expect a different choice, and knowing also that his joke would not cause any real harm to his partner in this game: no real jail involved here.

I find this incident revealing about the complexities of trust in real-world situations: playing “defect” in the PD game, he trusted the environment – the participants of the workshop – to take his joke as a joke. The outcome was also an unusual one: because it is more “rational” for

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<sup>22</sup> From the online version of Hardin’s book:

The trusted party has incentive to be trustworthy, incentive that is grounded in the value of maintaining the relationship into the future. That is, *I trust you because your interest encapsulates mine*, which is to say that *you have an interest in fulfilling my trust*. It is this fact that makes my trust more than merely expectations about your behavior. Any expectations I have are grounded in an understanding (perhaps mistaken) of *your interests specifically with respect to me*.

<sup>23</sup> For an overview over the considerable body of literature see Brembs (1996); also the online entry “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>

the participants to defect (thus avoiding the possibility to get a *high* sentence), almost invariably *both* participants in the experimental situation will in fact defect.

Thus, neither the experimental designs using different variants of the PD game, nor the questionnaire research cited earlier, nor even the complex reasoning of Luhmann and Giddens seems appropriate to adequately describe this one incident: it underlines Luhmann's and others' objection that the "rational choice" view of trust is in fact not trust, but simply calculation, but the beauty of this one moment – as I see it – lies in the self-confident and trusting *play* with the others' expectations. It is not simply – as both Luhmann and Giddens emphasize – a reliance on *others'* competence and good intentions, it also goes beyond the "four place predicate" of "a trustor (1) [trusting] a trustee (2) in one or more aspects of behaviour (3), under certain circumstances (4)" suggested by Nootemoo (2003: 2) as the presently most comprehensive formula of a trust relation. It goes beyond it precisely because of the *mixture* of a strong element of self-reliance with a strong element of trust in others in this incident. And while it also confirms that trusting involves an *irreducible uncertainty*, the story shows that the willing acceptance of (in this case: the joyful play with) the risk (in this case: to be morally condemned for the defection by the audience of fellow workshop participants) may be *intended* not to "reduce complexity" but, on the contrary, to *increase* the complexity: to allow and effect a learning process which would otherwise not have been possible<sup>24</sup>.

### **Philosophical suggestions and personal experience**

It appears that Annette Baier provided the first formulation of the problem of trust which was comprehensive enough to now merit the title of "classic." Her main point is that trust means that I entrust something to your care which is "close to my heart" – and "entrusting" means that I have no control over whether you will actually exercise that care or hurt me instead, through negligence or wilful action. The unique feature of her crisp definition is the use of the words "close to the heart" (Baier 2001: 51):

In my analysis trust means that the truster surrenders into the care of other persons (natural persons as well as legal ones, such as corporations, nations etc.) something that is close to his/her heart, and this caring of the other person implies decisions with a margin of discretion<sup>25</sup>.

Trudy Govier is another philosopher who dealt extensively with trust. She describes trust as an *attitude* which comprises three elements, all of which are mentioned in other definitions, but must come together to make trust a "social reality" (Govier 1997: 24):

All three aspects – cognitive, emotional, and behavioural – are required for trust to be a social reality. Without cognitive content we would have not trust but blind faith or

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<sup>24</sup> I is a credit to the quality of observations Luhmann displayed in early book on trust that this possibility is already mentioned (Luhmann 1989: 7f.): „Wo es Vertrauen gibt, gibt es mehr Möglichkeiten des Erlebens und Handelns, steigt die Komplexität des sozialen Systems, also die Zahl der Möglichkeiten, die es mit seiner Struktur vereinbaren kann, weil im Vertrauen eine wirksame Form der Reduktion von Komplexität zur Verfügung steht.“: *Where trust exists, there number of options for experience and action is higher, and the complexity of the social system increase, i.e. the number of possibilities which are commensurable with the system, because trust provides an effective form for the reduction of complexity.*

<sup>25</sup> „Meiner Analyse nach heißt Vertrauen, anderen Personen (natürlichen und juristischen, also etwa Firmen, Nationen etc.) die Sorge um eine Sache zu überlassen, die dem Vertrauenden am Herzen liegt, wobei dieses „Sich-Sorgen-um“ die Ausübung eines Ermessensspielraums impliziert.“

fixed hope. Without emotion we would not have trust but calculated risk-taking. Without a behavioural component, trust would be inoperative.

In the individual human being, Govier sees these aspects as coming together in an “attitude of trust” which has the following elements:

- A. expectations of benign, not harmful, behaviour based on beliefs about the trusted person’s motivations and competence;
- B. an attribution or assumption of general integrity on the part of the other, a sense that the trusted person is a good person;
- C. a willingness to rely or depend on the trusted person, an acceptance of risk and vulnerability; and
- D. a general disposition to interpret the trusted person’s actions favourably.

There is room for debate concerning the elements of this list. Yet, my own experiences and observations conform with Govier’s thoughts also on the element of the limits of trust – at a plane quite different from the one mentioned by Möllering concerning cooperation with Chinese business partners: the combination of observations and interviews in three countries (Namibia, Uganda, and Ivory Coast) in the context of an interdisciplinary research project led me to the conclusion that it is hard to escape a mounting distrust when an increasing scarcity of available resources favours competition against each other over cooperation with each other. Govier refers to situations even harsher than the ones I observed, but points in the same direction (Govier 1997: 44f.):

People whose social experience features harshness, poverty, discrimination, abuse, brutality, even torture and surveillance, are likely to gain an experience of the world that produces increased wariness, fear, and a sense of vulnerability and supports a negative picture of social and political life. For many such people life teaches bitter lessons. Complete and familiar strangers may seem threatening; home itself may be a place of bitter competition for food and other scarce resources. It does not seem plausible to discount such interpretations as biased, cynical, or paranoid. In such contexts the advice to “construct a better world” by trusting more seems inappropriate at best, dangerous at worst

Seen together with extremely cautious and standardized observations of children with a background experience of violence in the family, as compared to others without that background (Bugental et al., 1991)<sup>26</sup> this constitutes another argument for a “unity of experience” with respect to trust across cultures: while all children in all cultures are “designed” to learn trust in the experience with their mothers, to develop what Erikson called *Urvertrauen*<sup>27</sup>, the damage done to this capacity through experiences of violence results in lasting traumata – traumata which damage the individual’s ability to trust. The neglect of the crucial aspect of the personal *limits to trust*, might be the reason why most existing models and typologies of trust have been found of limited use when it comes to their application in crisis situations – in situations of trying to repair broken interethnic relationships after violent

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<sup>26</sup> It was found that children with experiences of violence had less capacity than children without this background in reacting in a culturally appropriate way to “polite” (i.e. not genuine) smiles from casually interacting strangers: traumatised children at the age of ten still reacted like all small children of less than three years of age: they broke the eye contact following a “false” smile.

<sup>27</sup> Barley, investigating not the sources of mistrust, but the sources of trust in early childhood, goes so far as to call a mother’s initial care a “gift” – a voluntary gift which not only confirms the human infants predisposition to *Urvertrauen*, but lays the foundation for all trust as well as for all freedom in the individual’s later life (Barley 1980: 30f.)

conflicts (Lenard 2000): you simply cannot trust when the situation reminds you of the suffering you had to endure through violence. In that case, *fear* becomes overwhelming.

In my own experience, the one element which is *essential* in the *experience* of trust is the absence of fear – which allows you to be open towards inner impulses and emotions as much as toward the outside world. And this fearless openness, in turn, allows creativity and innovation in one’s interaction with the physical environment as much as with other people. It allows *playfulness* and *experimenting*. Together with reduced attention to safeguards – which bind energy – this is probably at the root of the rather many advices for *more* trust in economic and political relationships. The *call*, however, will remain unheard if the *conditions* are not met for increased trust. And these conditions are marked by a sound vigilance which people display in different degrees – independently of their propensity to trust, as another recent study showed (Markoczy, 2003): Adults as much as children do assess the trustworthiness of whoever they deal with. As many studies have found, and as in the meantime expressed even in management seminars, discrepancy between words and deeds, or discrepancy between actual inner experience and the display towards the outside world, is the one major hindrance to trust. Error may be pardoned, but lying is not. And even in management seminars, the distinguishing factor between error and a lie is defined as the *intent* to deceive (Brodbeck, 2004). People may be gullible to some extent – but not for always.

I suggest that this is the reason why Trudy Govier’s advise of creating trust by becoming trustworthy (Govier 1997: 48)<sup>28</sup> is expressed in a saying widely used amongst practitioners of participatory approaches to development and among management consultants: “Walk the talk.” Govier also mentions that genuineness or authenticity is one of the criteria by which most people assess the trustworthiness of others. As we live in an age where global threats as a result of economic activities are standard fare in the news, it may be a case for vigilance to find out whether the use of “Walk the talk” for the title of a book advocating the use of markets for global sustainability (Holliday et al. 2002, describing the activities of the *Global Business Council for Sustainable Development*) is trustworthy.

### **Conclusion: can we trust our capacities for theorizing?**

I found support for my trust in the reasonability of the untrained human mind of “ordinary” people even in my internet survey of recent studies. One of Kassebaum’s interview partners in the preparatory rounds of his major work of devising, calibrating, and validating a measurement instrument for trust, told him the following:

“I know that someone whom I trust will not do anything which could harm me, that he means well. He will not harm me, he does not have bad intentions.” (Kassebaum 2004: 185)

This, I find, is in perfect agreement with what I quoted above from Annette Baier and Trudy Govier – and with my own experience. It is also remarkable that most of his respondents could attribute the famous dictum of “trust is good, but control is better” to Lenin – but in the overwhelming majority disagreed and said that it is better to trust people in general. It

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<sup>28</sup> “Being *trustworthy* is also a necessary step towards living in a world in which people are trusted and are trustworthy. Being trustworthy is a matter of having integrity and concern for others, living up to their legitimate moral expectations, and reliably carrying out tasks and duties. Being trustworthy is something that can be generally and less controversially recommended [than trusting; R.D.]”

consoles my own thinking to read such statements as gems in an otherwise admirably comprehensive and scientifically careful and conscientious dissertation.

The second support concerns differential attitudes of trust of “laypeople” towards science. Two recent German studies report on risk perception concerning climate change and mobile telephones. They both report a rather strong belief – or trust – of the general public in science in *some* respects, but at the same time a deep distrust in other respects. Interestingly, the trust is extended to those scientists who support a largely human causation of climate change and who clearly point to the dangers originating from climate change. These scientists are trusted, because they are seen as “independent” (Peters & Heinrich, 2005). The “general public” thus does not seem to be taken in by the “debunking of environmental alarmists” by Björn Lomborg (Lomborg 2001) which made the headlines some years ago and has made Björn Lomborg famous in some circles – where, according to an informed environmentalist’s recent casual observation, he still enjoys credibility despite the *Danish Committees for Scientific Dishonesty*’s verdict that he failed to conform to scientific standards of good practice<sup>29</sup>. Science in general, however, is not seen as trustworthy – precisely because people do not perceive it as independent any more: with respect to mobile telephones, only 21 per cent of respondents saw scientists as independent from the influence of the mobile telephone industry and therefore unable to come to clear recommendations concerning the health risks of mobile telephones (Zwick & Ruddat 2002: 12f.).

Studies such as the ones cited above *confirm* a conviction which I find important for social scientists in general, and particularly when studying a topic as basic and volatile as trust: basic in its enabling of experiences and learning – which is where Luhmann and his critic Barley can agree – and volatile from the perspective of the objective outside observer who never seems to be able to “catch” it. The conviction concerns the value of self-observation and the trust in the reasonability of this self-observation – for its own sake *and* as a sound basis for theorizing. This conviction allows to heed Devereux’ admonition that the analysis of counter-transference is scientifically more fruitful than the analysis of transference, and to change the situation he complained about in 1967: the refusal of anthropologists to be open to the *theories* advanced by the “primitives” under study, which he compared to the refusal of therapists to listen to their clients (Devereux 1967, Chapter X). Based on this kind of self-trust, trust in the reasonability of other people’s observational and interpretive powers becomes possible – a trust which any interaction modifies through a vigilance which enables almost imperceptible yet effective verification. The point some authors (e.g. Szerszynski 1999) stress is that *giving* trust in fact *creates* trust - that trust seems to possess a creative power: that it *may* act as a self-fulfilling prophecy<sup>30</sup>.

I am quite sure that most scientists are familiar with this mode of interaction – in all contexts where the public defense of particular propositions is not at issue: in all settings where the spirit of inquiring together prevails. This is what I termed *collaborative self-reflection* earlier: combining introspection with genuine communication. By way of supporting my plea to make

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<sup>29</sup> The 2005 yearly report still mentions the case (Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation, November 2006: 27):

“In its ruling of January 2003 DCSD found that, based on customary scientific standards, the defendant had acted at variance with good scientific practice in his systematically unilateral choice of data and in his argumentation. In addition DCSD found that if the book was to be judged as science, and not as a debate outline, the scientific message had been distorted to such an extent that the objective criteria for establishing scientific dishonesty had been met. DCSD did not find, however, that it had sufficient basis for establishing that the defendant had misled his readers wilfully or with gross negligence.

<sup>30</sup> I emphasize the *may* because there is no way around human freedom: were it not *may* it would not be trust but certain knowledge.

use of this mode especially for inquiring into ways of increasing trust in justifiable ways I can do no more than simply relate that this attitude has on more than one occasion opened doors in different unplanned settings and thus allowed me to confirm the usefulness of the “method” as much as the “propositions” set out in the paper. To some extent, the discussions at the workshop itself have borne out the validity of such an approach: we heard reports about discussions with local informants concerning trust in the system of gold trade in Benin, and we heard about a non-violent encounter between a group of insurgents and a group of South African forces in the Namibian independence war which moved the white leader of the government forces to settle precisely in that place years later. I mention this particular incidence because this particular emergence of a moment of trust seems identical to a similar one happening during World War I between German and French soldiers on patrol – the one story told to me as a small boy which I could never forget: a chance meeting in which “the moment to shoot” somehow passed and neither side found it possible to reopen fire. Not in Namibia and not in France.

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### **Some relevant Websites:**

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[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm)

**General Social Survey Series at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research:**  
<http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-SERIES/00028.xml>

**Institut für Marktpsychologie – “Brand Trust Research”**  
[http://www.ifm-mannheim.de/index3\\_im.html](http://www.ifm-mannheim.de/index3_im.html)

**SC Cooperative for Healthy Aging in Minority Populations – Resource Centers for Minority Aging Research – “Measurement Tools” for Trust in the Health Sector**  
<http://www.musc.edu/dfm/RCMAR/TrustTools.html>

**World Values Survey:**  
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## Appendix 1: Statistics on Websites and publications for Trust & Trust Measurement on Google, amazon.de and amazon.com

**Table 1: Basic Terms at Google and Amazon (Dec. 4, 2006):**

	GOOGLE.DE	Amazon.de	Amazon.com
Trust	291.000.000	4086	317215
Measuring Trust	24.500	0	0
Trust measurement	690	1	410
Measurement of Trust	10.900		
Vertrauen	21.500.000	882	4971
Vertrauensmessung	48	0	0
Messung von Vertrauen	84 Treffer	0	4

**Table 2: Published materials according to amazon search machine (Dec. 4, 2006)<sup>31</sup>:**

<b>Insgesamt (alle Kombinationen)</b>	<b>575 Ergebnisse 65%</b>	<b>All combinations:</b>	<b>211785 Results 66,6%</b>
„Vertrauen + Gott“	35 Ergebnisse 4%	„Trust + God“	26730 Results 8,4%
„Gottvertrauen“	32 Ergebnisse 3,6%	„Trust in God“	18226 Results 5,7%
„Vertrauen + Selbst“	14 Ergebnisse 1,6%	„Trust + Self“	8650 Results 2,7%
„Selbstvertrauen“	253 Ergebnisse 28,7%	Self-Confidence	74806 Results 23,5%
„Vertrauen + Macht“	15 Ergebnisse 1,7%	„Power + Trust“	11084 Results 3,5%
„Vertrauen + Staat“	5 Ergebnisse 0,6%	“Trust + State”	7896 Results 2,49%
„Vertrauen + Wirtschaft“	54 Ergebnisse 6,1 %	„Trust + Economy“	1197 Results 0,38%
„Vertrauen + Organisation“	5 Ergebnisse 0,6%	„Trust + Organization“	5027 Results 1,6%
„Organisation Vertrauen“	5 Ergebnisse 0,6%	„Organization + Trust“	5027 Results 1,6%
„Vertrauen + Management“	20 Ergebnisse 2,7%	„Trust + Management“	7333 Results 2,3%
„Vertrauen + Kontrolle“	14 Ergebnisse 1,6%	„Trust + Control“	4728 Results 1,5%
„Vertrauen + Führung“	15 Ergebnisse 1,7%	„Trust + Leadership“	3057 Results 0,97%
„Vertrauen + Psychologie“	48 Ergebnisse 5,4%	„Trust + Psychology“	745 Results 0,2%
„Vertrauen + Unternehmen“	17 Ergebnisse 1,9%	„Trust + Corporation“	4671 Results 1,47%
„Vertrauen + Leitung“	0 Ergebnisse	„Trust + Enterprise“	1359 Results 0,4%
„Vertrauen + Beratung“	2 Ergebnisse 0,2%	„Trust + Consulting“	241 Results 0,08%
„Vertrauen + Therapeut“	0 Ergebnisse	„Trust + Therapist“	1494 Results 0,47%
„Vertrauen + Arzt“	1 Ergebnis 0,1%	„Trust + Doctor“	3149 Results 1%
„Vertrauen + Gesundheit“	8 Ergebnisse 0,9%	„Trust + Health“	6011 Results 1,9%
„Vertrauen + Medizin“	8 Ergebnisse 0,9%	„Trust + Medicine“	1199 Results 0,4%
„Vertrauen + Ehe“	4 Ergebnisse 0,45%	„Trust + Marriage“	1636 Results 0,5%
„Vertrauen + Partnerschaft“	13 Ergebnisse 1,5%	„Trust + Partnership“	3619 Results 1,1%
„Vertrauen + Liebe“	31 Ergebnisse 3,5%	„Trust + Love“	20462 Results 6,5%
„Vertrauen + Sexualität“	3 Ergebnisse 0,3%	„Trust + Sexuality“	273 Results 0,09%
„Vertrauen + Erziehung“	23 Ergebnisse 2,6%	„Trust + Education“	3157 Results 1%
„Vertrauen + Kinder“	18 Ergebnisse 2 %	„Trust + Children“	5813 Results 1,8%
„Vertrauen + Eltern“	6 Ergebnisse 0,7%	„Trust + Parents“	4372 Results 1,4%
“Vertrauen”	883 Ergebnisse	“Trust”	317047 Results

<sup>31</sup> The date is mentioned here because the number of published titles had already risen again by December 17, 2006